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Abstract 
This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment to study how houseowners’ borrowing costs 
were affected by the housing value fluctuation in China using a novel micro-level data 
from an online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. The impacts on other equilibrium 
loan variables such as borrowing duration and numbers of lenders are also examined. 
By taking the housing purchase restriction policy shock as an exogenous event, we 
employ a difference-in-differences (DD) identification strategy. It is found that the 
equilibrium interest rate decreased, the growth rate of the deal completion time reduced 
and the number of investors went up for borrowers with house properties from the cities 
implementing the restriction policy. It echoes from a further triple differences (DDD) 
when considering city-specific effect based on samples with houseowners and non-
houseowners. In addition, we estimate the heterogeneous effect for both household and 
city-level characteristics. Our dynamic analysis indicates that effects on houseowners’ 
P2P borrowing activities persist for 9 months. The channel of the effect was from the 
collateral effect rather than the pure wealth effect.  
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I. Introduction 
China has witnessed unprecedented economic growth from past decades and become 
the second largest economy worldwide. Real estate, as a pillar industry in China, 
contributes tremendously on the rapid growth of Chinese economy and household 
consumption. However, along with the development of real estate sector, the soaring 
housing price has also drawn wide and serious concerns, which leads to a series of 
home-purchase restriction policies adopted by the Chinese government. Home-
purchase restriction, launched in 2010 and 2016 respectively, were implemented under 
different macroeconomic environments and city coverages in China. Specifically, the 
earlier policy in 2010 was in the context of the recovery of global financial crisis and a 
general boost in housing prices so that the government decided to apply a 
comprehensive housing purchase restriction throughout all the cities. Unlike the 2010’s 
policy, the government adjusted the housing purchase restriction scheme with a focus 
in China’s first- and second-tier cities in 2016 (Du & Zhang, 2015).  
The housing purchase restriction policy indicates a strong house wealth increase 
potential in the cities which announce it. The cities with home-purchase restriction after 
2010 have still experienced a roaring housing price as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also 
shows that, for the long run, the growth rate and price index of those cities increases 
even shaper compared with the cities never implementing home-purchase restriction 
policies. An empirical study from Li, Cheng, and Cheong (2017) confirms that the 
home purchase restriction only has long term effects on carrying down housing prices 
if housing prices monthly growth rate does not exceed 5%, while most of the cities in 
our sample1 with home-purchase restriction policies have more than 5% growth rate on 
a month-to-month basis from 2010 to 2016. Therefore, due to the learning effect of the 
previous practices, houseowners in the cities which announced the housing purchase 
 
1 According to the housing price data from Wind, 12 of 16 cities with home-purchase restriction 
policies have more than 5% growth rate on a month-to-month basis from 2010 to 2016. 
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restriction policy in 2016 would have a strong expectation of thriving housing prices 
for their properties. 
Housing price fluctuation could cause great wealth variations on household balance 
sheets (Disney & Gathergood, 2018) since housing value has been widely believed as 
a major component of household wealth (Banks & Tanner, 2002; Campbell & Cocco, 
2007). Tang (2006) and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) confirm that housing 
wealth effect is larger than the financial wealth effect by 6 cents on a dollar for marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC), which will strongly impact household level 
consumption. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) and Mian et al. (2017) clarifies the significant 
and unequal consumption decrease in US from 2006 to 2009 based on the role of house 
loan and varied geographic distribution of negative house price shocks. Schmalz, Sraer, 
and Thesmar (2013) finds that both the ownership of house and the variation of the 
housing price will significantly impact the household investment decisions. Besides, 
other household activities will also be affected by the housing prices swing, including 
labor decisions, educational selections (Lovenheim 2011; Lovenheim & Reynolds 
2013), divorce rates (Farnham et al. 2011), childbirth rates (Lovenheim & Mumford 
2013; Dettling & Kearney 2014), and long-term care insurance (Davidoff 2010). As a 
result, a larger housing wealth would, however, convert to a higher living expense, 
which discourages household financing and expenditure (Buiter, 2008). The empirical 
findings from Campbell and Cocco (2007) confirm that growing house wealth could 
promote consumption by adding households’ perceived wealth, or by decreasing 
borrowing constraints.  
In this paper, we attempt to extend the study of house wealth effect and investigate 
how P2P crowdfunding activities were affected by the home-purchase restrictions in 
China using a novel micro-level data from an online peer-to-peer lending platform. 
When contemplating FinTech development in China, the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending 
industry constitutes one vital aspect of it. By December 2018, 6,618 online P2P 
  
3 
platforms have been actively involved in business, with a value of RMB1,794.8 billion 
transactions in total, according to WDZJ, an authoritative P2P online loan industry 
portal in China. P2P crowdfunding activities turn out to be a significant financial market 
for household micro financial activities. For example, Renrendai, one of the largest P2P 
online lending platforms in China, allows borrowers set loan interests and amount first 
and investors could make investment decisions based on the borrowers’ relevant 
information.  
Recent empirical literature already touched the determinants of P2P borrowing costs 
and the impact of economic shocks on P2P activities. Age, income, positive financial 
prospects and housing tenure are found to be significant in determining online 
borrowing costs in Del and Young (2006)’s research. Michels (2012) finds that 
volunteer and unverifiable disclosures significantly lessen borrowing costs in p2p 
lending platform.  Li, Liu, and Tian (2018)’s study identify that policy uncertainty 
negatively affects households’ access to small loans in p2p lending platform. 
Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) further considered housing ﬂuctuations could have a 
significant influence on P2P lending credit availability. Based on the background of 
2008 financial crisis, they found that the declining housing price will make 
houseowners face lower funding success rates, higher interest rates, greater credit 
rationing, and quicker loan delinquency.  
While our study put efforts to disentangle the mixing Chinese economic forces and 
target on the unique Chinese housing policies and shed light on the role of home-
purchase restriction shocks on household borrowing activities in Chinese P2P platform. 
We consider the housing restriction policy announced by government as the housing 
value shock for two reasons. Firstly, the policy is issued mainly due to either the high 
housing price or the great housing price growth rate, the timing of the policy 
announcement should be highly correlated with previous measurement. Secondly, as 
the information asymmetry between the government and individual exist in Chinese 
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housing market, government own more information than household, the policy 
announcement can be regarded as the external shock to the housing market. 
Based on this exogenous shock, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) 
identification strategy to empirically disentangle the effects. We target on within group 
differences for the houseowners’ responses to the home-purchase restrictions. Treating 
the home-purchase restrictions that were widely implemented in 21 Chinese cities in 
2016 as a policy shock, we could control for city-level time invariant confounding 
factors and nationwide macroeconomics trends that might be correlated with loan level 
outcomes. As pooled cross-sectional data set is employed, the endogeneity concerns 
are further alleviated by incorporating bunch of borrowers’ characteristics, as 
homeownership status and credit decisions are likely to be correlated with those 
individual level features (Ramcharan & Crowe, 2013).  
To test the potential heterogeneous effect that shape the results, we explicitly use 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation methods. Household-level 
characteristics, including gender, marriage, education level, job position, SOE jobs, and 
car, are selected to evaluate the impact of home-purchase restrictions on the house 
owners. In addition, various information of the local macroeconomic conditions, such 
as city-level GDP growth rate, wage growth rate, and residential investment growth 
rate for the last three years (2013-2015), and population growth rate and real estate 
investment growth rate for the last two years (2014-2015) are used as proxies to directly 
test the validity of the expectation effect hypothesized above.   
Our research results show that home-purchase restriction policies significantly 
reduce the treated houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates, slow down their increase 
of duration of borrowing, and promote the number of lenders who fund this P2P 
borrowing requests. As to the economic effect, the decrease of interest rate for the 
treated group is 0.4 bps larger than that of the control group. Duration growth rate for 
the treated group is 2.6% less than its counterparts. There are five more investors each 
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borrowing deal for the treated group after the shock compared with the control group. 
Following the spirit of Cai (2016), We further employ a DDD estimation to confirm the 
results using the whole sample (houseowners and non-house owners), which could 
control potential city-specific effects during the sample period. The additional DDD 
result still holds. 
 We also test the household-level and city-level heterogeneous effect of the home-
purchase restriction policy. The result indicates that male or unmarried houseowners 
whose city announced the home-purchase restriction policy would like to post a sharper 
decreasing P2P interest rate, experience a shorter funding duration, and attract more 
funding investors compared with female or married houseowners in the treated regions. 
Treated houseowners with high education levels, stable salary payments, state-owned 
enterprise jobs, or car, could take more advantages in P2P funding activities compared 
with their counterparts in the treated regions after the housing policy shocks because of 
their stronger financial position and lower default possibilities. We further consider the 
city-level economic development in the policy shocks. The results show that the P2P 
interest rates drop sharper for the treated houseowners who live in the treated regions 
with higher GDP growth rate, population growth rate, residential wage growth rate, real 
estate investment growth rate, and residential investment growth rate, while duration of 
funding also has a slower increase for the treated houseowners higher GDP growth rate. 
Therefore, economic development of the city could increase the wealth effect of the 
residents, their household could have a stronger financial position and take more 
advantages in the P2P borrowing activities. The dynamic effect outcomes show that the 
effects of the home-purchase restriction on houseowners’ P2P borrowing activities 
persist for 9 months. 
After that, we test the channel that makes the previous effect. The effect of the policy 
is made through the rising house wealth and the related borrowing collateral of the 
houseowners of the treated regions. It is because the home-purchase restriction policy 
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implies the rise of the house wealth for the houseowners who tend to have a higher 
borrowing collateral and lower default risks. As a result, they could obtain a stronger 
financial position in the financial market. We also consider household loans and age to 
confirm the borrowing collateral effect. We find that houseowners with borrowing 
constraints benefit more from the policy effect but their age profile which is generally 
along with the pure wealth effect does not cause significant correlation. 
Our study contributes to two strands of current literatures. Firstly, it explores the 
housing wealth effect from a new perspective, which demonstrates the household credit 
access to unsecured small loans. Existing studies have examined the impact of the asset 
value on household consumption, investment, and borrowing activities by taking the 
secured loans into their consideration (Mian, Rao, & Sufi, 2013; Schmalz, Sraer, & 
Thesmar, 2013; Mian & Sufi, 2018). Along with the development of the micro-loan 
market in China, an increasing number of households choose to borrow from the P2P 
market and their activities gradually attract more attention from researchers (eg Lin and 
Viswanathan, 2015; Li, Liu & Tian, 2018). This study complements the effect of 
housing value fluctuation literatures over the government home-purchase restriction 
policy shock and try to build the causal relationship between the housing price 
variations and borrowing activities in the P2P market. Secondly, our study replenishes 
P2P crowdfunding literatures by standing on the demanding side of the market through 
the P2P market mechanism in China. We emphasize on how P2P borrowers and 
investors respond to the new information reflected in the policy shock. Our research 
echoes the Ramcharan and Crowe (2013)’s study and further confirms the relationship 
between the house price fluctuation and P2P credit availability, but our identification is 
different. This study targets on the home-purchase restriction polices from different 
cities, which is positively related to the housing price and could be considered as 
external shock because of the information asymmetry between the government and the 
housing market. Moreover, the market mechanism of the US P2P lending is different 
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from the one in China. Renrendai P2P lending in China employ the posted-price 
mechanism instead of auction model used by Prosper.com before 2010. Under posted-
price mechanism, the borrowing interest rate and amount are set by borrowers, while 
investors only voice their opinions by specifying the investment amount and duration. 
Finally, our study supports the house wealth effect through the borrowing collateral 
channel in P2P platform and exploit diverse house wealth effects of heterogeneity in 
household-level and city-level. 
The remains of the paper are organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical 
foundation of the study. Section III describes the data and summary statistics. Section 
IV explains the estimation model and results, Section V concludes.  
II.  Theoretical Foundation 
Previous studies generally identify the housing wealth shock by measuring how those 
shocks affect housing return. For example, Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) believes that 
local economic growth is an important wealth effect that stimulates residential 
household level activities. While, other researchers track the effects of government 
policies on households’ behavior, like the important roles that monetary policy play in 
propagating the shock transmission through the credit channel (Bernanke & Gertler, 
1995; Benmelech & Bergman, 2012; Iacoviello, 2005; Kaplan et al., 2018). Tax policy 
and credit supply expansion policy embrace the similar effects (Sommer & Sullivan, 
2018). Empirical evidences are found that households’ debt and consumption 
responded actively to U.S tax policy (Souleles, 1999), and the effects for debt were 
particularly strong for those who were liquidity unconstrained (Agarwal et al., 2007). 
Di Maggio & Kermani (2017) studies the heterogenous impact of banking 
deregulations on different states in the U.S. This exogenous variation of credit supply 
due to anti-predatory lending contributed to the local house prices and employment rate. 
Cai (2016) also indicates that the implications of agriculture insurance provision raises 
household borrowing size while decreases loan interest rates for Chinese rural 
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households. The intertwined relationships among government housing policies, house 
prices and household behavior are intriguing. The reason is that among households’ 
balance sheets, housing values are found to have considerable amplification effects in 
real business cycles via the collateral channel in calibrated DSGE models (Iacoviello, 
2005; Iacoviello & Neri, 2010; Liu, Wang & Zha 2013; Guerrieri & Iacoviello, 2017).  
The mechanism that drives the bond between the swings of the house value and 
household consumptions and decisions is widely explained through two major 
assumptions: pure wealth effect and borrowing collateral effect (Sinai & Souleles, 2005; 
Cooper, 2013; Berger, 2015, Cloyne et al, 2019). The pure wealth effect considers that 
the house is one type of financial asset, the rising house prices increase households’ 
nominal housing wealth, households may borrow more and consume more as they feel 
richer (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, & Shiller 2013). However, nominal 
wealth is not real wealth (Sinai & Souleles 2005; Buiter 2010). Because the increase in 
the housing value may offset by the increase in the future rental cost, the pure wealth 
effect should be obvious for the one with short horizon. Many studies examine the pure 
wealth effect through age profile. Old homeowners are regarded as the cohort with short 
horizon, they may expect to sell the house and exit the housing market in the near future 
and convert the nominal wealth to real wealth. In contrast, young home owners have 
the long horizon, the nominal wealth would be offset by future rental cost. As a result, 
the pure wealth effect can be tested by looking at the heterogeneous effect with respect 
to age (Campbell & Cocco 2007, Attanasio et al., 2009, Mian & Sufi, 2011). Gan (2010) 
studies the relationship between house value and credit card spending in Hong Kong, 
and find that pure wealth effect, which is identified by looking at how the consumption 
respond to the house value shock across households with different number of houses, 
can partly explain the relationship. Households without borrowing constraints could 
benefit from the pure wealth effects captured by their lifetime budget constraints. The 
canonical certainty-equivalent life-cycle model, on the contrary, suggests an invariant 
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household behavior after predictable future income fluctuations (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954; Carroll, 2001: Friedman, 2018).  
However, Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) and Buiter (2010) questioned about the pure 
wealth effect and stated that the effect of housing appreciation or depreciation on the 
net wealth of the house owners is ambiguous since housing wealth should be treated as 
both an asset and an expenditure good. A complex mechanism is included behind the 
housing wealth changes for house owners and non-house owners.  For instance, Cho 
(2011) shows that housing price fluctuation would work in opposite directions for 
household with house and without house.  
Therefore, many research studies the relationship between house prices and 
economic activities concentrating on the borrowing collateral channel (Guerrieri & 
Iacoviello, 2017). Housing value makes up the greatest part of the household’s portfolio 
and could be the largest type of collateral. As the relax to credit market would increase 
the borrow demand (DeFusco 2017), the collateral effect implies that the value of 
collateral would increase along with the housing price appreciation, so that the 
increased collateral value would decrease the borrowing cost, especially for households 
who are experiencing a borrowing constraint (Campbell & Cocco 2007). Aoki et al. 
(2004) explain the effect of housing value on household consumption via credit market 
by considering credit frictions in their general equilibrium model. The collateral 
channel works by amplifying and propagating monetary policy shocks on housing 
demand and consumption. Iacoviello (2005) distinguish the effect of different type of 
shocks and theoretically prove that positive demand shock improves the household or 
firm’s debt capacity and increase the consumption and investment. A number of 
empirical evidences show that the housing wealth impact the borrowing consumption 
via collateral channel.  Cooper (2013) finds the collateral channel, instead of wealth 
effect channel, could explain the relationship between the non-housing consumption 
and housing value by looking at the heterogenous effect across groups of households 
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with different level of borrowing constraints. Cloyne et al (2019) uses a rich dataset to 
verify the collateral channel by examining the heterogeneous effect of LTV, age, 
income and income growth on the elasticity of borrowing to housing price. They find 
the elasticity is strongly respond to high LTV ratio, even controlling for the other 3 
factors, suggesting collateral channel can be used to explain their findings of positive 
relationship between housing value and loan amount. A rise in housing values translates 
to an increase in collateral values and thus makes households’ borrowing constraints 
non-binding. This encourages leverage and consumption through the classic 
consumption Euler equation. Later studies confirm that housing wealth helps to 
alleviate credit constraints for household and even of their potential investments 
(Schmalz, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2013; Corradin & Popov, 2015). Corradin and Popov 
(2015) echoes the previous research that housing wealth is able to lessen credit 
constraints for potential entrepreneurs based on the collateral channel.  
These theories allow us to explore the house wealth effect and the heterogeneity of 
the effect by taking advantages of the quasi-natural experiment of the home-purchase 
restriction based on the sample of Chinese P2P platform. The effect of the home-
purchase restriction on Chinese P2P borrowers’ activities could be explored by the 
identification of the channel of the house wealth effect, including the pure wealth effect 
and the borrowing collateral effect. The test of the heterogeneity of the effect could 
further exploit the mechanism that how house-level and city-level characteristics 
influence the house wealth effect. 
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
The empirical analysis is based on the household-level data collected from Renrendai, 
one of the largest P2P online lending platforms in China. Our sample consists of all of 
P2P funded loans from January 2016 to August 2017, 10 months before and after 
October 2016, the month with a bunch of announcements of the home-purchase 
restriction policies. The household residing in the 21 cities (Table 1) which adopted 
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home-purchase restriction are attributed in the treatment group while others are in the 
control one. The P2P sample includes funded borrowers’ borrowing interests, amount, 
number of lenders, duration of the funding process, as well as their individual 
characteristics. To summarize, our sample includes 249,309 households, of which 
107,699 household has house and 141,612 has no any house properties. For 
houseowners, 32,702 of them are in the treatment group where home-purchase 
restriction policies are adopted while 74,997 of them are in control regions.  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the key variables for the period January 
2016 to September 2016 before the announcement of home-purchase restriction 
policies.  Gender is a dummy variable with one is female and zero is male. Marriage is 
a dummy variable with one is married and zero otherwise. Age indicates the age of the 
borrower. Salary is a variable indicating a borrower’s monthly income level, where n=0 
represents whose wage is no more than 1000 RMB,   n=1 means monthly income is 
between 1000-2000 RMB, n=2 means monthly income is between 2000-5000 RMB); 
n=3 means monthly income is between 5000-10000RMB; n=4 means monthly income 
is between 10000-20000RMB; n=5 means monthly income is between 20000-50000 
RMB; n=6 means monthly income is above 50000 RMB. Education is a variable 
indicating the education level of borrowers, where n=0 (if the borrower is high school 
certificate and below), n=1 (if the borrower is college-degree holder), n=2 (if the 
borrower is university- degree holder), n=3(if the borrower is with postgraduate degree 
and above). Work years is a variable showing the working experience of borrowers, 
where n=0 (if the working experience is no more than 1 year), n=1(if a borrower has 1-
3 years’ working experience), n=2 ( if a borrower has 3-5 years’ working experience), 
n=3 (if a borrower has more than 5 years’ working experience). Car is a dummy variable 
with one has car and zero otherwise. Job position	is a dummy variable with one working 
for salariats and zero otherwise. 	SOE	is a dummy variable with one working for state-
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own companies and zero otherwise.  Loan is a dummy variable with one having house 
loan or car loan and zero otherwise. 
Based on the characteristics of the P2P borrowers from the sample, the treated 
houseowners’ average borrowing interests (10.26%) are significantly lower than that of 
the controlled houseowners (10.29%). Meanwhile, the average loan size (98000 RMB), 
borrowing duration (11.21 hours), and number of lenders (130.1) for the treated 
borrowers are significantly higher than those of controlled houseowners, which are 
87,000 RMB, 9.818 hours, and 113.5, respectively. Also, the treated region borrowers 
exhibit the differences with more females (0.299 versus 0.311), less marriage (0,756 
versus 0.763), younger age (37.51 versus 38.36), and higher education level (1.270 
versus 1.392), shorter working experience (2.044 versus 2.161 years), loan percentages 
(62.4% versus 53.9%), stable salary payment percentages (0.176 versus 0.133), and the 
average amount of salary (3.941 versus 3.289) compared to the borrowers from the 
control region. The treated regions have significantly higher GDP growth rate (9.1% 
versus 8.5%), population growth rate (0.6% versus 0.3%), real estate investment growth 
rate (12.9% versus 1.7%), and residential investment growth rate (14.5% versus 9.20%), 
as well as lower wage growth rate (9.4% versus 10.5%) than the control regions.  
IV. Estimation Strategies and Results 
The progressively implementation of the home-purchase restriction policies 
introduced variations in house wealth across time periods, cities, and household 
borrowing activities. According to these variations, we use both DD and DDD 
estimations in the empirical analysis.  
4.1 The Impact of the Home-purchase Restriction on Houseowners 
4.11 Common Trend Analysis 
To analyze the how home-purchase restriction affect P2P borrowing activities, we 
first plot the evolution of houseowners in the treatment and control groups. As 
presented in Figure 2, houseowners were in a similar trend for borrowing interests, 
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duration (minutes), and number of lenders before the announcement of home-purchase 
restriction. These borrowing factors shake at a different rate in the treatment group after 
the first shock, September 26, 2016. We also estimate the common trend assumptions 
for the pre-policy trend (January-September 2016) in the following regression to 
examine whether DD is an applicable approach for our study: 
(1) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /2345(')(&6- + /7	3)(8'+, + /9345(')(&6-∗ 3)(8'+, + /;	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(2) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,-= 	/0 + /2345(')(&6- + /7	3)(8'+, + /9345(')(&6-∗ 3)(8'+, + /;	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(3) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 		= 	/0 + /2345(')(&6- + /7	3)(8'+, + /9345(')(&6-∗ 3)(8'+, + /;	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
In the regressions, i, r, t are borrower, city, and month indices, correspondingly. %&'()(*'+,- , @A5B()_>(&6()*+,-	,  DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-	 are P2P funded interest, 
numbers of lenders who invest their funds to achieve borrowers’ funding goal, and 
duration of the borrowing activities. 345(')(&6- indicates monthly trends during the 
study. 3)(8'+,  is a dummy variable with one for the cities implementing home-
purchase restriction while zero otherwise. From Table 3, we could conclude that the 
common trend assumption is valid since most of the interaction terms, /9 , are 
insignificant. The only exception is April and June, which already has early home-
purchase restriction policy release from Langfang and Shanghai. 
4.12 DD Analysis 
Based on the common trend assumption, we could further test the effect of home-
purchase restriction on the houseowners through the following DD model: 
(4) 		%&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(5) 	@A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(6) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+,- + ?+,- 
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where 3)(8'G=*'+ is an indicator equal to one for treatment regions after the policy 
shock and zero otherwise. In the model using %&'()(*'+,- as the independent variable,  <=&')=>+,-	indicates various control variables for household characteristics, including 
gender, married, age, salary, work years, and education. In the model using @A5B()_>(&6()*+,-	  and DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-  as the independent variable, <=&')=>+,-	indicates control variables including gender, marriage, age, salary, work 
years, education, amount of funded loan, and borrowing interests. 	?+,-	represents a full 
set of city, month, and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the city and 
month level to account for any correlations of the error terms within each firm. The 
others are the same as regression model 1.  
Table 4 reports the trend of houseowners’ borrowing activities by time period and 
regions, from which, borrowing interests for the treated and control group declined by 
18.4% and 19.9% respectively after the policy shock.  The borrowing duration for the 
treated and control group increased 6.662 hours and 8.238 hours respectively. The 
number of investors increased 46.983 and 44.931, correspondingly.  
From DD results shown in Table 5, we could further identify that the treated 
houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates drop more significantly rather than those of 
control regions after the announcement of home-purchase restriction in their cities. This 
outcome means that treated houseowners could tend to post a lower borrowing costs to 
crowdfund in the P2P platform. We also find that the growth rate of borrowing duration 
is 2.6% less for treated houseowners compared with controlled ones after the shock, 
which demonstrates that treated houseowners could borrow relatively faster in the P2P 
platform compared with their counterparts due to the home-purchase restriction. In 
addition, the number of lenders has a significantly larger increase for the treated 
houseowners (by 5 lenders), which shows that more lenders are inclined to invest their 
money to the treated borrowers after the shock. This result responds to the previous 
theories of house borrowing collateral effect since housing value has also been seen as 
an explicit asset valued by banks or other financial intermediations. 
4.13 Additional DDD Estimations 
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Following the spirit of Cai (2016), we further implement the following DDD model 
to confirm the results using the whole sample (houseowners and non-house owners). 
This DDD framework could control for potential city-specific effects in our study (Cai, 
2016), since some cities might have some unique potential trends during the sample 
period. Factors other than the policy shock could affect the result. Based on this 
estimation, we target on the differences between houseowners in the treated regions 
and the control regions by considering the differences in non-houseowners before and 
after the shock.  
(7) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ ℎ8*I=A*(+ + ?+,- 
(8) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ ℎ8*I=A*(+ + ?+,- 
(9) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ ℎ8*I=A*(+ + ?+,- 
From Table 6, we confirm the previous research results that the DDD interaction 
term for interest and duration of the borrowing is significantly negative and for number 
of the lenders is significantly positive. This outcome shows that treated houseowners 
could experience a greater decrease of interest rates and a larger increase of lenders’ 
investment after the shock compared with all of the other households. However, there 
is an insignificant outcome for duration, which indicates that treated houseowners’ 
duration of borrowing had not been strongly affected by the policy shock in this DDD 
setting. The reason shows that there might be other factors affecting treated 
houseowners’ borrowing r duration rather than this policy shock. 
4.2 Heterogeneity Effect 
4.21 Household Characteristics 
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In order to estimate the effect of heterogeneity of the household characteristics on 
the variation of houseowner responses, a DDD framework is further conducted as 
follow: 
(10) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K*+ + ?+,- 
(11) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,-= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K*+ + ?+,- 
(12) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K*+ + ?+,- 
In the model with %&'()(*'+,- , <=&')=>+,  represents control variable, including 
gender, married, age, salary, work years, and education. In the model with @A5B()_>(&6()*+,-	and	DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- , <=&')=>+,  represents control variable, 
including gender, married, age, salary, work years, education, loan amount, and 
borrowing interests.	%&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K*+  includes various household-level 
characteristics, like gender, marriage, education levels, job position, state-owned 
enterprise jobs, and car.  
As results shown in the Table 7, the lowering interests is sharper for treated male 
houseowners compared with treated females, which indicates a gender discrimination 
in P2P market. There is a stronger decrease of interests after the shock for treated 
unmarried houseowners compared with treated married ones since unmarried 
houseowners might face less pressures compared to their counterparts. Significantly 
positive result in education shows that treated houseowners with high education enjoy 
a larger reduced interest. Also, treated houseowners with stable salary payment, state-
owned enterprise jobs, or car, could experience a sharper declining borrowing costs 
after their city announced the policy due to their stronger financial position and lower 
default possibilities.  
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Meanwhile, Table 8 demonstrates that treated unmarried houseowners could achieve 
their borrowing goals quicker compared to those treated married ones with the same 
reason mentioned above. Also, treated houseowners with high education background, 
stable salary payment, state-owned enterprise jobs, or car, could attain their P2P 
borrowing targets faster than their counterparts after their city announced the housing 
policy due to their stronger financial position and lower default possibilities.  
Table 9 illustrates that treated male houseowners could attract more lenders 
compared with female houseowners as the reason mentioned above. Treated 
houseowners with higher education background, stable salary payment, state-owned 
enterprise jobs, or car, could attain more investors’ funds compared with their 
counterparts after the housing policy shocks because of their stronger financial position 
and lower default possibilities. 
4.22 Additional DDDD Estimations 
As mentioned above, we follow the methodology from Cai (2016) and implement the 
following DDDD (quadruple difference) model to confirm the heterogenous effect of 
the household characteristics using the whole sample (houseowners and non-house 
owners). This DDDD framework is able to control for potential city-specific effects in 
our study (Cai, 2016).  
(13) %&'()(*'+,- = 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ ℎ8*I=A*(+ ∗ %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K* + ?+,- 
(14) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ ℎ8*I=A*(+ ∗ %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K* + ?+,- 
where %&64J46A8>_<ℎ8)8K'()4*'4K*+  includes household-level characteristics as 
referred before. The results from Table 10 and Table 11 match our previous findings 
that treated male or unmarried houseowners could achieve greater P2P lending 
advantages, including lower interest rates and more lenders’ investment. Treated 
houseowners with higher education background, stable salary payment, SOE jobs, or 
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car, could attain greater P2P lending advantages compared with their counterparts after 
the home-purchase restrictions. 
4.23 City Characteristics 
In order to estimate the heterogeneity effect of the city level characteristics on the 
variation of houseowner responses to the policy, we use the following DDD models: 
(15) %&'()(*'+,-(DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-) 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /23)(8'G=*'+∗ QDR_S)=T'ℎ+ + ?+,- 
(16) %&'()(*'+,-(DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-) 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /23)(8'G=*'+∗ R=GA>8'4=&_S)=T'ℎ+ + ?+,- 
(17) %&'()(*'+,-(DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-) 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /23)(8'G=*'+∗ U8S(_S)=T'ℎ+ + ?+,- 
(18) %&'()(*'+,-(DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-) 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /23)(8'G=*'+∗ V(8>_W*'8'(_S)=T'ℎ+ + ?+,- 
(19) %&'()(*'+,-	(DA)8'4=&_E4&+,-) 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /23)(8'G=*'+∗ V(*46(&'48>_S)=T'ℎ+ + ?+,- 
In the model with %&'()(*'+,- , <=&')=>+,  represents control variable, including 
gender, married, age, salary, work years, and education. In the model with 	DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- , <=&')=>+,  include gender, married, age, salary, work years, 
education, loan amount, and borrowing interests. QDR_S)=T'ℎ+ , R=GA>8'4=&_S)=T'ℎ+ , U8S(_S)=T'ℎ+ , V(8>_X'8'(_S)=T'ℎ+ , and V(*46(&'48>_S)=T'ℎ+	represent three-year average city GDP growth rate, three-year 
average city population growth rate, two-year average city residential wage growth rate, 
three-year average city real estate investment growth rate, and two-year city residential 
investment growth rate, respectively. Results from Table 12 (panel A) demonstrate that 
treated houseowners’ P2P interest rate has a significantly negative relationship with 
their residential city’s GDP growth rate, population growth rate, residential wage 
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growth rate, real estate investment growth rate, and residential investment growth rate. 
From Table 12 (panel B), we could also find that treated houseowners’ duration of 
funding is only significantly negative correlated with three-year average city GDP 
growth rate. The impacts from other city economic development indices are not obvious. 
This still could be summarized that the better economic situation of the city, especially 
for its real estate industry, more advantages the treated households could experience in 
their P2P borrowing activities.  The result matches the study from Glewwe and Jacoby 
(2004) that local economic growth is a significant wealth effect that stimulates 
residential household activities. This DDD estimation already include several important 
city-specific factors so that the additional DDDD test is not necessary.  
4.3 Dynamic Effects  
The release of the house-purchase restriction policy may impact household 
borrowing activities for a certain period. Furthermore, the magnitude and the 
significance of the effect could vary over time. Through the following regression, our 
study estimates the dynamic effect of the house-purchase restriction policy on 
household P2P borrowing activities to check those dynamic possibilities.  
(20) %&'()(*'+,- 										= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	DY&854K_E=&'ℎ-+ /93)(8'G=*'+ ∗ DY&854K_E=&'ℎ- + ?+,- 
(21) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 										= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	DY&854K_E=&'ℎ-+ /93)(8'G=*'+ ∗ DY&854K_E=&'ℎ- + ?+,- 
(22) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 										= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	DY&854K_E=&'ℎ-+ /93)(8'G=*'+ ∗ DY&854K_E=&'ℎ- + ?+,- 
where DY&854K_E=&'ℎ- contains a set of month dummies after the shock. 
The results in Table 13 indicate that the effect of house-purchase restriction policy on 
houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates, duration, and number of lenders becomes 
significant right after the shock in October 2016 until July 2017. The impact persists 
throughout 9 months of the post period.  
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4.5 the Channel of the House Wealth Effect on Borrowing Outcomes 
Since the home-purchase restriction will lead to a rising housing price in those 
treatment regions, which represents a higher house wealth for the borrowers with 
houses. To identify the channel of house wealth effect in our study, we conducted the 
following DD model to test the impact of the home-purchase restriction on non-
houseowners. As shown in Table 14, treated non-houseowners do not face significant 
variations in their borrowing interest rates, duration, and number of lenders after the 
release of the policies. As a result, unlike houseowners, there is no such an effect on 
non-houseowners since their financial situation will not be seriously affected by the 
announcement of the policy or the effect is ambiguous.  
(23) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(24) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + ?+,- 
(25) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+,- + ?+,- 
According to the theories discussed in Section II, the channel of the effect of house 
value swings on household consumptions and decisions are generally explained 
through pure wealth effect or borrowing collateral effect (Sinai & Souleles, 2005; 
Cooper, 2013; Berger, 2017; Cloyne et al, 2019). The pure wealth effect means that the 
rising house prices increase real housing wealth for households, which encourages 
households borrow more and consume more as they feel richer, especially for elder 
people (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, & Shiller 2013). The collateral effect 
indicates that the value of house collateral would increase along with the housing price 
appreciation. The rising collateral value would further decrease the borrowing cost, 
especially for households who are facing borrowing or collateral constraints (Campbell 
& Cocco 2007). 
In order to examine the channel of house wealth effect in our estimation, we consider 
the financial constraints and age profile using the following a DDD model: 
(26) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ Z=8&+, + ?+,- 
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(27) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ Z=8&+, + ?+,- 
(28) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+,- + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ Z=8&+, + ?+,- 
where Z=8&+, is a dummy variable indicates that whether household has an existing 
loan (car or house loan). One is with loan and zero represents without loan.  
The results from Table 15 demonstrate that houseowners with financial constraints 
experience a stronger impact from the home-purchase restrictions, which means they 
could take a shaper decreasing interest rate and quicker borrowing duration. This result 
matches the existing study in the collateral channel that houseowners with financial 
constraints involve in a more obvious health wealth effect (Cooper, 2013; Corradin & 
Popov, 2015; Cloyne et al., 2019). 
Most existing literature studies the pure wealth effect through age profile (Campbell 
& Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009; Mian & Sufi 2011). They find that the pure wealth 
effect can be tested by looking at the heterogeneous effect with respect to age. As a 
result, our study further use age as an interaction term in the DDD model to test the 
pure wealth effect as follows: 
(29) %&'()(*'+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ 8S(+, + ?+,- 
(30) @A5B()_>(&6()*+,- 		= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+, + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ 8S(+, + ?+,- 
(31) DA)8'4=&_E4&+,- 	= 	/0 + /23)(8'G=*'+ + /7	<=&')=>+,- + /93)(8'G=*'+∗ 8S(+, + ?+,- 
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The insignificant research result from Table 10 shows that there is no strong 
correlation between age and the effect of policy shock. Therefore, the pure wealth effect 
is not appropriate in explaining the house wealth effect of the study.  
In sum, based on the signs of home-purchase restriction, the increasing housing value 
help treated P2P borrowers, especially the ones with financial constraints, reduce the 
borrowing costs, shorten the borrowing duration, and attract more investors through the 
borrowing collateral effect.  
V. Conclusion  
Household borrowing costs and related activities in P2P lending platform are subject 
to great variations for diverse reasons. Government policies are often the causes to 
create such distortions. Based on a quasi-natural experiment in the announcement of 
home-purchase restriction policies in multiple of cities in China in late September and 
early October, our study uses a series of DD, DDD, and DDDD models to estimate the 
impact house-purchase restriction policy on houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates, 
duration, and the number of lenders. We identify that home-purchase restriction is 
inclined to decrease treated houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates and slowing 
down the duration growth rate, while increasing the number of lenders who fund this 
borrowing requests through the channel of borrowing collateral effect. Since the home-
purchase restriction policy implies the increase of the house price and the house wealth 
for the houseowners, houseowners tend to have a higher borrowing collateral value that 
decreases their default risks and strengthen their financial position in the financial 
market. The DDD estimation considering household loans and age confirms the 
borrowing collateral effect that houseowners with borrowing constraints benefit more 
from the policy effect while age profile does not make significant impacts on this 
relationship.  
We test the heterogenous effect of borrowers’ characteristics on the policy shock. 
The results show that male or unmarried houseowners who resides in the treated region 
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could enjoy much lower interest rates, get the fund quicker, and attract more lenders in 
P2P funding activities compared with their counterparts in the treated regions after the 
announcement of the policy. Treated houseowners with higher education background, 
stable salary payment, state-owned enterprise jobs, or car, could take more advantages 
in P2P funding activities compared with their counterparts after their city announces 
the housing policy because of their stronger financial position and lower default 
likelihoods. We further consider the city economic situation in the policy shock. The 
results show that P2P interest rates decrease sharper for treated houseowners whose 
cities have a higher GDP growth rate, population growth rate, residential wage growth 
rate, real estate investment growth rate, and residential investment growth rate, while 
duration of funding also has a much slower increase for the treated houseowners whose 
cities have a higher GDP growth rate. Therefore, economic growth of the city is able to 
increase the wealth effect of the residents, which offers household a stronger financial 
position and more advantages in the P2P borrowing activities.  
Our research contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of government 
housing policies on households and investors at the Chinese online micro-financing 
market. We examine the collateral channel of the house wealth effect on household 
borrowing activities based on housing price swings. We also shed new light on the 
individual and city factors influencing P2P borrowing activities by connecting macro-
economic shocks with micro-financing variations.  
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Table 1 The key Date of Restrictive House-purchase Policy for 21 cities in 2016 
City Name Restrictions Date 
Beijing 30-09-2016 
Tianjing 01-10-2016 
Langfang 01-04-2016 
Shanghai 27-05-2016 
Nanjing 26-09-2016 
Wuxi 02-10-2016 
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Suzhou 04-10-2016 
Hangzhou 28-09-2016 
Hefei 02-10-2016 
Fuzhou 07-10-2016 
Xiamen 06-10-2016 
Nanchang 08-10-2016 
Jinan 03-10-2016 
Zhengzhou 01-10-2016 
Wuhan 03-10-2016 
Guangzhou 04-10-2016 
Shenzhen 04-10-2016 
Zhuhai 04-10-2016 
Foshan 07-10-2016 
Dongguan 07-10-2016 
Chengdu 01-10-2016 
  
30 
 
 
Figure 1 housing price index fluctuation over 2010-2016 
The figure plots the housing price index and month-on-month growth rate over 2010-2016 for 70 
cities. Restricted cities are the cities implementing the housing purchase restriction policy between 
September of 2010 and March of 2011. Data is from WIND database.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
This table presents summary the mean for characteristics of funded loans, borrowers and cities in 
the pretreatment periods (1 Jan 2016 and 26 Sep 2016). Data on loans, borrowers is from Renrendai 
P2P platform. City characteristic data is from CSMAR. Standard deviations are in brackets. For 
The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Has house   Has no house All sample 
 
Control Treated Difference 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
amount 87332.88 97766.27 -10433.4*** 
 
74255.82 82832.55 
 
(46853.46) (51866.5) 
  
(46240.19) (48134.89) 
interest 10.287 10.263 0.030*** 
 
10.161 10.225 
 
(0.479) (0.488) 
  
(0.51) (0.499) 
Duration(hour) 9.818 11.205 -1.392*** 
 
11.519 10.81 
 
(16.418) (18.795) 
  
(19.097) (18.071) 
No. investor 113.468 130.114 -16.600*** 
 
100.215 109.806 
 
(130.61) (147.412) 
  
(124.655) (130.981) 
gender 0.311 0.299 0.012*** 
 
0.34 0.323 
 
(0.463) (0.458) 
  
(0.474) (0.468) 
age 38.362 37.514 0.850*** 
 
34.531 36.465 
 
(8.547) (8.258) 
  
(8.196) (8.539) 
education 1.27 1.392 -0.122*** 
 
1.277 1.291 
 
(0.717) (0.682) 
  
(0.681) (0.697) 
married 0.763 0.756 0.007 
 
0.608 0.69 
 
(0.426) (0.43) 
  
(0.488) (0.462) 
jobPosition 0.133 0.176 -0.043*** 
 
0.092 0.12 
 
(0.339) (0.38) 
  
(0.289) (0.325) 
houseLoan 0.539 0.624 -0.085*** 
 
0 0.302 
 
(0.498) (0.484) 
  
(0) (0.459) 
workYears 2.161 2.044 0.117*** 
 
1.837 1.994 
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(1.022) (1.045) 
  
(1.072) (1.06) 
salary 3.289 3.941 -0.652*** 
 
3.223 3.355 
 
(1.206) (1.247) 
  
(1.147) (1.211) 
GDP growth rate 0.085 0.091 -0.006*** 
 
0.09 0.088 
 
0.045 0.018 
  
(0.029) (0.035) 
wage growth rate 0.105 0.094 0.011*** 
 
0.097 0.1 
 
(0.028) (0.024) 
  
(0.028) (0.028) 
population growth 
rate 0.003 0.006 -0.002*** 
 
0.007 0.006 
 
(0.012) (0.024) 
  
(0.021) (0.018) 
residential 
investment 
growth rate 
0.092 0.145 -0.053*** 
 
0.128 0.116 
 
(0.145) (0.051) 
  
(0.104) (0.119) 
real estate growth 
rate 0.017 0.129 -0.112*** 
 
0.091 0.068 
 
(0.159) (0.066) 
  
(0.121) (0.138) 
Observations 34654 13162   41101 88917 
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of borrowing cost for household with house, by treatment 
 
Figure 2.2 Evolution of duration for household with house, by treatment 
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Figure 2.3 Evolution of No. of investors for household with house, by treatment 
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Table 3 Test common trend prior to policy intervention 
The table reports common trend before the home-purchase restriction policy shock. Column 1, 3, 5 and 7 show the common trend assumption of DD estimation for 
subsample household who has house. Column 2, 4, 6, 8 for the subsample with no house. City fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered 
at city level. Treated is a dummy variable with one for the cities implementing home-purchase restriction while zero otherwise. The definition of variables refers to 
Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  interest ln amount ln duration No investor 
 
Has house Has no house Has house Has no house Has house nohousedur_min hashouseNo 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
treated×2016 February -0.014 0.002 0.002 -0.016 0.033 0.108 1.707 
 
(-0.79) (0.04) (0.09) (-0.48) (0.42) (1.17) (0.33) 
treated×2016 March -0.054** -0.124** -0.025 -0.012 0.064 0.179** 0.683 
 
(-2.48) (-2.29) (-0.62) (-0.22) (1.35) (2.42) (0.16) 
treated×2016 April -0.030 -0.083 -0.015 0.031 0.107** 0.175** 6.255 
 
(-1.47) (-1.43) (-0.52) (0.63) (2.06) (2.14) (1.24) 
treated×2016 May -0.006 -0.100* 0.047 0.026 0.113* 0.178** -1.812 
 
(-0.29) (-1.76) (1.43) (0.45) (1.74) (2.07) (-0.31) 
treated×2016 June -0.031* -0.098* 0.019 0.025 0.399*** 0.445*** 5.937 
 
(-1.73) (-1.69) (0.56) (0.43) (5.92) (4.93) (1.12) 
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treated×2016 July -0.013 -0.035 0.036 -0.005 -0.002 0.051 2.142 
 
(-0.64) (-0.63) (1.36) (-0.15) (-0.04) (0.75) (0.34) 
treated×2016 August -0.003 -0.025 0.031 0.002 0.036 0.041 1.024 
 
(-0.17) (-0.51) (1.17) (0.06) (0.54) (0.60) (0.16) 
treated×2016 September -0.023 -0.100** 0.007 -0.009 0.087** 0.145** 0.650 
 
(-1.30) (-1.99) (0.29) (-0.24) (2.08) (2.15) (0.14) 
gender -0.006* 0.009* 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.038*** 0.020 7.065*** 
 
(-1.78) (1.88) (13.75) (12.68) (3.21) (1.35) (5.98) 
married -0.015*** -0.021*** 0.025*** 0.047*** -0.011 0.019 3.415** 
 
(-3.97) (-4.63) (4.02) (6.27) (-1.01) (1.32) (2.19) 
age 0.000 -0.001** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 1.231*** 
 
(0.62) (-2.06) (21.54) (16.45) (4.11) (5.05) (10.86) 
salary -0.017*** -0.047*** 0.086*** 0.081*** 0.019*** 0.037*** 9.050*** 
 
(-10.94) (-9.32) (26.61) (15.24) (4.47) (5.38) (13.29) 
workYears 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.055*** 0.115*** 0.007 -0.003 10.237*** 
 
(5.77) (8.78) (14.85) (23.41) (1.42) (-0.44) (14.92) 
education 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.147*** 0.207*** -0.013* 0.001 22.044*** 
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(7.19) (4.46) (25.61) (19.61) (-1.77) (0.04) (20.96) 
Constant 10.827*** 10.845*** 10.291*** 9.823*** 5.323*** 5.131*** -41.972*** 
 
(758.64) (246.05) (352.37) (197.20) (149.61) (76.77) (-8.59) 
Observations 47,807 41,064 47,807 41,064 47,807 41,064 41,064 
R-squared 0.590 0.483 0.239 0.242 0.302 0.313 0.073 
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Table 4 Timely trend of borrowing cost, duration, and No. of investors 
This table presents mean value of borrowing cost, duration and No. of investors for different groups 
within different period. Treated is a dummy variable with one for the cities implementing home-
purchase restriction while zero for control. Standard deviations are in brackets. For The definition of 
the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
2016.01.01-2016.09.26 2016.09.27-2017.08.31 difference 
Interest 
  
 
treated 10.26 10.08 -0.184*** 
 
(0.488) (0.373)  
control  10.29 10.09 -0.199*** 
 
(0.479) (0.373)  
 
   
Duration    
treated 11.21 17.87 6.662*** 
 
(18.795) (25.287)  
control  9.818 18.06 8.238*** 
 
(16.418) (25.483)  
 
   
No. of investor 
 
 
treated 130.1 177.1 46.983*** 
 
(147.412) (188.989)  
control  113.5 158.4 44.931*** 
 
(130.61) (176.331) 
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Table 5 The effect of the housing value fluctuation on credit access ability 
The table reports the DD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth fluctuation on the borrowing 
cost, duration and number of investors. The results are for subsample with households having house. 
Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. City fixed 
effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and 
clustered at city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * 
stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
interest ln_duration No_investor 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
treatpost -0.004*** -0.004** -0.028 -0.026*** 2.690 5.090*** 
 
(-4.71) (-2.27) (-1.62) (-4.40) (0.86) (5.36) 
ln_amount 
   
0.228*** 
 
123.982*** 
    
(4.01) 
 
(10.87) 
interest 
   
0.166 
 
-12.617 
    
(0.75) 
 
(-1.19) 
gender 
 
0.007 
 
0.011* 
 
-0.007 
  
(1.51) 
 
(1.78) 
 
(-0.01) 
married 
 
0.069 
 
0.042 
 
-4.177* 
  
(1.44) 
 
(1.49) 
 
(-1.79) 
age 
 
0.002** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.012 
  
(2.46) 
 
(2.31) 
 
(0.15) 
salary 
 
-0.013*** 
 
-0.004 
 
1.387 
  
(-3.25) 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(1.20) 
workYears 
 
0.005 
 
-0.014*** 
 
2.543** 
  
(0.93) 
 
(-6.22) 
 
(2.41) 
education 
 
0.007 
 
-0.064*** 
 
8.720*** 
  
(0.47) 
 
(-8.67) 
 
(3.44) 
Constant 10.171*** 10.065*** 5.978*** 1.791 143.762*** -1,143.469*** 
 
(408.94) (195.71) (41.68) (0.99) (27.88) (-5.68) 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Month-year 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,840 109,840 109,840 109,840 109,840 109,840 
R-squared 0.440 0.449 0.231 0.249 0.058 0.285 
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Table 6 DDD estimation results of the effect of housing value change on borrowing outcomes 
The table reports the DDD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth fluctuation on the borrowing 
cost, duration and number of investors. Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-
purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. City fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all 
estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. The definition of 
the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
interest ln_duration No_investor 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
treatpost 0.038** 0.034** 0.003 -0.024 3.867 -4.267 
 
(2.26) (2.07) (0.12) (-1.29) (1.18) (-1.49) 
hasHouse 0.058*** 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.045*** 27.572*** -2.170*** 
 
(10.90) (5.05) (3.27) (-5.36) (18.03) (-2.62) 
treatpost×hasHouse -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.029* -0.006 7.603*** 13.553*** 
 
(-4.43) (-4.50) (-1.67) (-0.37) (3.84) (7.05) 
ln_amount 
   
0.183*** 
 
111.990*** 
  
   
(15.46) 
 
(67.71) 
interest 
   
0.221*** 
 
-26.536*** 
    
(6.64) 
 
(-16.03) 
gender 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.829* 
  
(8.45) 
 
(3.46) 
 
(1.67) 
married 
 
0.047*** 
 
0.030*** 
 
-3.863*** 
  
(13.01) 
 
(5.32) 
 
(-6.27) 
age 
 
-0.000** 
 
0.000 
 
0.310*** 
  
(-2.38) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(7.52) 
salary 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.022*** 
 
-1.786*** 
  
(12.55) 
 
(6.95) 
 
(-6.07) 
workYears 
 
0.038*** 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.814*** 
  
(16.57) 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-3.44) 
education 
 
0.017*** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
7.036*** 
  
(6.84) 
 
(-3.09) 
 
(8.27) 
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Constant 10.090*** 9.890*** 6.029*** 1.738*** 122.039*** -851.087*** 
 
(1,600.01) (867.08) (767.94) (7.18) (103.28) (-40.36) 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 254,804 254,804 254,804 254,804 254,804 254,804 
R-squared 0.321 0.341 0.224 0.245 0.050 0.285 
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Table 7 Heterogeneity of the house value effect on borrowing cost: household characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of the house value change on from individual characteristics. 
The dependent variable is borrowing cost. The results are for subsample with households having 
house. Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 
otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects and 
time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and 
clustered at city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** 
and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×gender 0.014** 
    
 
(2.49) 
    
treatpost×married 
 
0.083*** 
   
  
(5.62) 
   
treatpost×education 
  
-0.024*** 
  
   
(-2.95) 
  
treatpost×SOE 
   
-0.069*** 
 
    
(-4.57) 
 
treatpost×hasCar 
    
-0.063*** 
     
(-3.50) 
Constant 10.066*** 10.078*** 10.060*** 10.070*** 10.065*** 
 
(1,004.90) (990.26) (984.40) (990.56) (1,005.81) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,840 109,840 109,840 104,606 109,840 
R-squared 0.449 0.450 0.449 0.461 0.451 
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Table 8 Heterogeneity of the house value effect on duration: household characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of the house value change from individual characteristics. The 
dependent variable is duration. The results are for subsample with households having house. Treatpost 
is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. All control 
variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects and time fixed effects are 
controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. 
The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×gender -0.007     
 (-0.44)     
treatpost×married  0.134***    
  (7.17)    
treatpost×education   -0.045**   
   (-2.35)   
treatpost×SOE    -0.113***  
    (-4.00)  
treatpost×hasCar     -0.092*** 
     (-3.93) 
Constant 1.790*** 1.855*** 1.789*** 1.738*** 1.861*** 
 (6.14) (6.32) (6.14) (5.87) (6.24) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,840 109,840 109,840 104,606 109,840 
R-squared 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.247 0.249 
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Table 9 Heterogeneity of the house value effect on No. of investors: household characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of the house value change from individual characteristics. The 
dependent variable is No. of investors. The results are for subsample with households having house. 
Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. All 
control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects and time fixed effects are 
controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. 
The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×gender 5.296** 
    
 
(2.28) 
    
treatpost×married 
 
-4.563 
   
  
(-1.37) 
   
treatpost×education 
  
9.147*** 
  
   
(4.35) 
  
treatpost×SOE 
   
5.286** 
 
    
(2.17) 
 
treatpost×hasCar 
    
4.723* 
     
(1.92) 
treatpost×loan 
     
      
Constant -1,142.810*** -1,145.666*** -1,142.991*** -1,173.776*** -1,150.319*** 
 
(-43.01) (-43.14) (-43.11) (-44.11) (-43.20) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,840 109,840 109,840 104,606 109,840 
R-squared 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.284 0.285 
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Table 10 Heterogeneity of DDD estimation result of the effect of housing value change on 
borrowing cost: household characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of DDD estimation result of Table 8. The dependent variable is 
borrowing cost. Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 
otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects and time 
fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at 
city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×hasHouse×gender -0.007     
 (-0.87)     
treatpost×hasHouse×married  0.078***    
  (4.36)    
treatpost×hasHouse×education   -0.047**   
   (-2.44)   
treatpost×hasHouse×SOE    -0.007  
    (-0.44)  
treatpost×hasHouse×hasCar     -0.063*** 
     (-2.67) 
Constant 9.890*** 9.900*** 9.875*** 9.895*** 9.884*** 
 (861.91) (859.95) (656.89) (855.30) (845.07) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 254,804 254,804 254,804 236,505 254,804 
R-squared 0.342 0.343 0.342 0.354 0.344 
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Table 11 Heterogeneity of DDD estimation result of the effect of housing value change on No. of investors: household characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of DDD estimation result of Table 8. The dependent variable is No. of investors. Treatpost is defined as 1 for 
cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects 
and time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. The definition of the 
variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×hasHouse×gender 1.312 
    
 
(0.53) 
    
treatpost×hasHouse×married 
 
-5.530* 
   
  
(-1.67) 
   
treatpost×hasHouse×education 
  
6.858** 
  
   
(2.13) 
  
treatpost×hasHouse×SOE 
   
-9.532** 
 
    
(-2.55) 
 
treatpost×hasHouse×hasCar 
    
-6.017** 
     
(-2.01) 
Constant -849.941*** -849.156*** -849.884*** -871.913*** -853.707*** 
 
(-40.48) (-40.77) (-39.88) (-40.62) (-40.73) 
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Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 254,804 254,804 254,804 236,505 254,804 
R-squared 0.285 0.285 0.286 0.284 0.286 
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Table 12 Heterogeneity of the house value effect on borrowing outcomes: city characteristics 
The table presents heterogenous effect of the house value change from city characteristics. The dependent variable is borrowing cost in panel A and 
duration in panel B. The results are for subsample with households having house. Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase 
restriction and 0 otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all 
estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** 
and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A  Dependant variable: Interest Rate 
     
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×GDP growth rate  -0.556*** 
    
 
(-335.52) 
    
treatpost×wage growth rate  
 
-0.196*** 
   
  
(-244.26) 
   
treatpost×population growth rate  
  
-0.355*** 
  
   
(-131.43) 
  
treatpost×real estate growth rate 
   
-0.052*** 
 
    
(-67.45) 
 
treatpost×investment growth rate  
    
-0.035*** 
     
(-19.22) 
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Constant 10.065*** 10.062*** 10.065*** 10.065*** 10.065*** 
 
(190.95) (187.51) (191.59) (195.73) (195.72) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,820 101,849 109,820 109,820 109,820 
R-squared 0.448 0.451 0.448 0.448 0.448 
Panel B  Dependant variable: Duration 
     
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
treatpost×GDP growth rate -0.997*** 
    
 
(-352.79) 
    
treatpost×wage growth rate 
 
0.546 
   
  
(0.84) 
   
treatpost×population growth rate  
  
0.340 
  
   
(0.97) 
  
treatpost×real estate growth rate 
   
-0.062 
 
    
(-0.71) 
 
treatpost×investment growth rate  
    
0.355 
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(1.20) 
Constant 1.792 1.811*** 1.790*** 1.791 1.790*** 
 
(0.99) (5.98) (6.13) (0.99) (6.14) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109,820 101,849 109,820 109,820 109,820 
R-squared 0.249 0.250 0.249 0.249 0.249 
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Table 13 Dynamic effect of housing value fluctuation on borrowing cost, duration and No. of investors 
The table presents dynamic effect of housing value fluctuation on borrowing cost, duration and No. of investors. Treated is a dummy variable with one 
for the cities implementing home-purchase restriction while zero otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all estimations. City fixed 
effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. The definition 
of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  interest ln_duration No_investor 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
treated×2016 November 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.080*** 0.081** 5.088 4.155 
 
(5.70) (5.78) (3.18) (3.11) (1.41) (1.08) 
treated×2016 December 0.041*** 0.038*** -0.022 -0.025 8.410*** 8.117** 
 
(31.35) (20.41) (-0.98) (-1.11) (4.42) (3.14) 
treated×2017 January 0.036*** 0.037*** -0.012 -0.012 21.343*** 19.443*** 
 
(11.56) (8.34) (-0.73) (-0.72) (9.75) (6.89) 
treated×2017 February 0.055*** 0.047*** -0.030 -0.036 33.299*** 28.105*** 
 
(13.58) (12.67) (-1.09) (-1.36) (8.48) (7.38) 
treated×2017 March 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.011 -0.012 23.470*** 25.666*** 
 
(9.61) (7.09) (-0.33) (-0.35) (5.16) (5.63) 
treated×2017 April 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.000 0.000 24.574*** 25.609*** 
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(11.85) (8.86) (0.01) (0.01) (5.05) (4.88) 
treated×2017 May 0.040*** 0.041*** -0.029 -0.028 21.174*** 20.726*** 
 
(7.67) (6.28) (-1.27) (-1.23) (5.64) (5.63) 
treated×2017 June 0.045*** 0.043*** -0.005 -0.006 9.448 6.871 
 
(6.33) (5.79) (-0.33) (-0.43) (1.72) (1.38) 
treated×2017 July 0.050*** 0.049*** -0.044* -0.045* 21.845*** 20.405*** 
 
(4.54) (4.61) (-2.11) (-2.10) (6.08) (6.01) 
treated×2017 August -0.037* -0.033 -0.127*** -0.121*** -7.422* -4.629 
 
(-1.88) (-1.63) (-5.31) (-4.57) (-2.12) (-1.46) 
Constant 9.758*** 9.566*** 6.618*** 6.509*** 163.365*** -65.859*** 
 
(1,826.47) (234.99) (995.80) (151.49) (128.73) (-5.62) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60,621 60,621 60,621 60,621 60,621 60,621 
R-squared 0.456 0.479 0.531 0.533 0.069 0.111 
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Table 14 Robustness check on the effect of the housing value fluctuation on credit access ability 
The table reports the DD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth fluctuation on the borrowing 
cost, duration and number of investors. The results are for subsample with households having no house. 
Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. City 
fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are shown in brackets 
and clustered at city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and 
* stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  interest ln_duration No_investor 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
treatpost 0.030 0.016 0.013 -0.018 13.448*** 2.564 
 
(1.41) (0.84) (0.40) (-0.63) (4.04) (0.82) 
ln_amount 
   
0.142*** 
 
106.369*** 
    
(10.06) 
 
(46.66) 
interest 
   
0.264*** 
 
-32.156*** 
    
(6.38) 
 
(-15.05) 
gender 
 
0.030*** 
 
0.031*** 
 
1.776*** 
  
(10.30) 
 
(4.01) 
 
(2.79) 
married 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
-3.430*** 
  
(7.93) 
 
(2.93) 
 
(-5.12) 
age 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.001 
 
0.427*** 
  
(-9.01) 
 
(-1.46) 
 
(7.52) 
salary 
 
0.051*** 
 
0.044*** 
 
-2.178*** 
  
(18.44) 
 
(11.94) 
 
(-6.26) 
workYears 
 
0.054*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
-2.078*** 
  
(14.54) 
 
(2.93) 
 
(-6.97) 
education 
 
0.025*** 
 
-0.001 
 
5.191*** 
  
(7.31) 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(3.95) 
Constant 10.077*** 9.841*** 6.084*** 1.697*** 123.607*** -729.853*** 
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(1,112.53) (560.78) (424.02) (5.86) (86.90) (-23.89) 
City fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year 
fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144,951 144,951 144,951 144,951 144,951 144,951 
R-squared 0.251 0.297 0.225 0.250 0.043 0.290 
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Table 15 Mechanism tests of the effect of housing value change on borrowing outcomes 
The table shows the results of the mechanism tests of the effect of housing value change on borrowing 
outcomes. The dependent variable is borrowing cost in column 1 and 3 and duration in column 2 and 4. 
The results are for subsample with households having house. Treatpost is defined as 1 for cities after 
implementing home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Loan is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
household has house loan or car loan and 0 otherwise. All control variables in Table 3 are included for all 
estimations. City fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are 
shown in brackets and clustered at city and period level. The definition of the variables refers to 
Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
wealth_int wealth_dur coll_int coll_dur 
VARIABLES interest ln_duration interest ln_duration 
treatpost -0.041** 0.085*** 0.000 0.056*** 
 
(-2.45) (3.33) (0.06) (10.41) 
age 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** (0.25) 
 
(2.29) (0.86) (3.28) 
 
treatpost×age 0.001 -0.002 
  
 
(1.15) (-1.24) 
  
loan 
  
0.023** 0.015 
   
(2.62) (1.06) 
treatpost×loan 
  
-0.029** -0.067*** 
   
(-2.56) (-3.20) 
Constant 10.155*** 2.600 10.137*** 2.614 
 
(228.14) (1.01) (226.61) (1.02) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,720 98,720 98,720 98,720 
R-squared 0.441 0.341 0.441 0.341 
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Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions 
VARIABLE  ABBR. DESCRIPTION 
Dependent Variables   
Loan's Interest  interest The percentage of principle charged by loan platform to a borrower 
Duration of processing  ln duration Logarithm of minutes took by the borrower of the funding process 
Number of lenders  no. of lenders The total number of lenders who are willing to invest on the loan 
Loan amount  ln amount Logarithm of loan amount received by the borrower. 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender  gender A dummy variable with one if the borrower is a female; zero otherwise 
Marital Status   married A dummy variable with one is married and zero otherwise  
Age  age The age of the borrower. 
Salary 
 
salary 
A variable indicating a borrower’s monthly income level, where n=0 
represents whose wage is no more than 1000 RMB, n=1 means 
monthly income is between 1000-2000 RMB, n=2 means monthly 
income is between 2000-5000 RMB; n=3 means monthly income is 
between 5000-10000RMB; n=4 means monthly income is between 
10000-20000RMB; n=5 means monthly income is between 20000-
50000 RMB; n=6 means monthly income is above 50000 RMB. 
Education  
 
education 
A variable indicating the education level of borrowers, where n=0 (if 
the borrower is high school certificate and below), n=1 (if the borrower 
is college-degree holder), n=2 (if the borrower is university- degree 
holder), n=3(if the borrower is with postgraduate degree and above) 
Car Ownership  hasCar A dummy variable with one if the borrower owns a car; zero otherwise 
House ownership  hasHouse A dummy variable with one if the borrower owns a house; zero otherwise 
House/Car Loan  houseLoan A dummy variable with one if the borrower has either a house loan or a car loan; zero otherwise 
Job Position 
 
jobPosition A dummy variable with one the borrower working for salariats and zero otherwise 
Work Years 
 
workYears 
A variable showing the working experience of borrowers, where n=0 
(if the working experience is no more than 1 year), n=1(if a borrower 
has 1-3 years’ working experience), n=2 ( if a borrower has 3-5 years’ 
working experience), n=3 (if a borrower has more than 5 years’ 
working experience) 
State-own Employee 
 
SOE A dummy variable with one working for state-own companies and zero otherwise 
City Characteristics 
GDP Three-Years’ 
Average Growth Rate 
 GDP growth 
rate 
An average growth rate of Gross Domestic Productions (GDP) from 
2013 to 2015 
Wage Three-Years’ 
Average Growth Rate 
 wage growth 
rate 
An average growth rate of residential wages from 2013 to 2015 
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Population Two-Years’ 
Average Growth Rate 
 population 
growth rate 
An average growth rate of the amount of population from 2014 to 2015 
Real Estate Two-Years’ 
Average Growth Rate 
 real estate 
growth rate 
An average growth rate of the number of real estate investment from 
2014 to 2015 
Residential Investment 
Three-Years’ Average 
Growth Rate 
 investment 
growth rate 
An average growth rate of the quantities of residential investment from 
2013 to 2015 
